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On 1 April, the British Parliament voted in a series of indicative votes to determine
what, if any, alternative plan for withdrawal from the European Union can command
the support of the House of Commons: all plans put forward again failed to command
a majority. In a recent intervention, John Finnis has suggested that the government
should prorogue Parliament until after 12 April in order to terminate the current
parliamentary debate. This would result in a no deal Brexit by default operation of
the law and avoid any softer version of Brexit that Parliament may decide to support.
The government would effectively silence Parliament to achieve its preferred
version of Brexit. Such an outcome would be fundamentally at odds with British
parliamentary democracy, especially principles of democracy and representative and
responsible government.
Constitutional convention on prorogation
The Cabinet Manual defines prorogation as the conclusion of the parliamentary
session and a recess causing an effective suspension of the parliamentary
process. Prorogation is a personal prerogative of the Monarch exercised on the
advice of Ministers. Pursuant to a strong constitutional convention the Queen
will only exercise this power in a politically uncontroversial and predictable
manner. Typically, there is no conflict between this convention on prorogation
and ministerial advice, as ministerial advice tendered by the government has
been uncontroversial and predictable. Barring the notable exception of a General
Election, a session of Parliament will last for one year interrupted by a recess period
lasting a few days before reassembly for a further one-year session. The current
session has exceptionally lasted for more than a year in order to facilitate the legal
implementation of Brexit. There are two notable exceptions from the 20th century
when a session of Parliament was ended early by prorogation.
In 1948 a Labour government instituted a short session of Parliament to overcome
the House of Lords’ obstruction to what would become the Parliament Act 1949.
The session began on 14 September and ended on 25 October 1948. However,
while certainly an unusual prorogation, it was not politically controversial in the sense
considered here. A clear majority of MPs clearly desired the legislation to pass and
were in favour of prorogation to achieve this outcome.
A more recent example of an allegedly controversial prorogation occurred in the
run-up to the 1997 General Election. Two Conservative MPs were accused in a
Guardian article of taking money in return for submitting questions to Parliament.
The aptly named Cash for Questions affair led then Prime Minister Major to establish
the Committee on Standards in Public Life, whose report was scheduled to be
delivered before the next General Election. Faced with the imminent publication
of the report, it has been alleged that the Prime Minister opted for an early
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prorogation, leaving an unusually long time period before polling day in order to
avoid embarrassment. However, it must be reiterated that even this allegedly
controversial prorogation was ultimately in facilitation of a General Election, and
therefore in line with precedent and supportive of the constitutional convention on
prorogation.
Ministerial advice
The convention on ministerial advice stipulates that the Monarch will generally
follow the advice given by Ministers when exercising personal prerogative powers.
The reasoning is that it would be difficult to justify vesting prerogative powers
in a Monarch without a convention that ties the exercise of these powers to the
government which is ultimately accountable to Parliament. At first glance, this
cardinal convention on ministerial advice would appear to suggest that the Monarch
is bound to follow ministerial advice on prorogation, regardless of how out of step
with the established convention on prorogation. However, it is worth going beyond
this initial impression to consider the deeper relationship between the convention
on ministerial advice and on prorogation. Thankfully there are some enlightening
parallels to the debate on royal assent, where the debate has been more robust and
nuanced.
Scholarly opinion on royal assent and ministerial advice can be broadly divided into
two camps. On one view it is a mistake to assume that the convention on ministerial
advice applies to royal assent or at least to assume that they conflict on their proper
interpretation.
The former position has recently been advanced by Mark Elliott.  He argues that
ministerial advice to withhold royal assent would interfere with the constitutional
bedrock of the constitution: Parliamentary sovereignty. The doctrine provides that
it is Parliament, not government, that can make and unmake any law, and this is
incompatible with an unqualified veto of the Prime Minister over bills that have duly
passed both Houses. Only the latter is in his view subject to ministerial advice.
Nick Barber reaches a similar conclusion, but bases his argument on the principle
behind the conventions on royal assent and ministerial advice. He argues that
no meaningful conflict arises between them: both conventions ultimately serve to
uphold principles of democracy, representative and responsible government. It is
contradictory therefore be invoked to justify an outcome contrary to the ordinary
application of the convention on royal assent. This would seem to support the view
that ministerial advice is not decisive to prorogation, at least to the extent that both
conventions pull in the same direction.
Not everyone shares this view on the interplay between the conventions on
ministerial advice and royal assent. Adam Tomkins, Rodney Brazier and Robert
Craig suggest that the ministerial advice convention applies to royal assent and may
require the Monarch to withhold assent even if a bill has duly passed both Houses.
From this position we might infer that ministerial advice ought also be decisive for the
purposes of prorogation. However, the arguments are based on the idea that MPs
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could, in the event that the Government advises to withhold royal assent, move a
motion of no confidence in the government.
Scholars seem to agree that ministerial advice convention serves at least in
part constitutional principles of democracy and responsible and representative
government. Much the same is true of the constitutional convention on prorogation.
The predictable and politically uncontroversial exercise is designed at least in part to
prevent abuses of power by the government and consolidate Parliament’s relevance
as a constitutional actor. In this sense, both conventions ultimately serve the same
ends.
It is true that it is common practice under the Standing Orders for the Government
to enjoy considerable influence over the business of both Houses. This is largely
uncontroversial for instrumental reasons: a government that commands the support
of the House of Commons is granted some leeway to implement its legislative
agenda. However, it is less clear, as Elliott argues in his post, that this common
practice has any implications for the underlying constitutional position. Parliament
has every right to determine the ‘(…) legal parameters within which the Executive
branch is permitted to operate.’ Likewise, significantly shaping and setting the
business of Parliament with the consent of MPs in order to implement a legislative
agenda is one thing, using a prerogative power to effectively eliminate Parliament
as a constitutional actor is quite another. The former is a politically acceptable
consequence of a government enjoying the confidence of the House of Commons,
the latter is an unconscionable abuse of procedural power.
Conclusion
Prorogation deprives Parliament of any ability to fulfil its deliberative and legislative
function, and crucially to hold the government to account for its exercise of
prerogative powers through committees, inquiries and ultimately through motions
of no confidence. If ministerial advice were to trump these considerations, then
it would in the words of Barber (speaking on royal assent) ‘(…) operat[e] against
democratic values rather than upholding them. Rather than supporting parliamentary
government, it would undermine it.’ Crucially, this view would likely be shared even
by those who in the context of royal assent argue for a stronger role of ministerial
advice. This is because their arguments are premised on Parliament’s ability to
hold government accountable for tendering advice to withhold royal assent. With
prorogation this crucial safeguard is not available: a Parliament in recess cannot
move a motion of no confidence. As Anne Twomey concludes in her excellent
book The Veiled Sceptre at least where a government has or is poised to lose the
confidence of the House of Commons it is ‘(…) not entitled to remain in office and
continue governing simply because it can exercise procedural powers to avoid proof
of the loss of confidence in it.’ It would be hoped that this much at least is common
ground regardless of one’s views on ministerial advice. Parliament is a deliberative
body and coming to a majority decision through compromise and debate are core
to its constitutional and institutional roles. If preventing a debate and vote on bills
amounted to constitutionally permissible grounds for prorogation, then Parliament’s
role and relative strength in the constitutional framework would be greatly diminished
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in favour of an overpowering executive. The government could and certainly would
veto legislation whenever it pleases and in time use the threat of prorogation to
whip backbench and opposition MPs into submission. The better view is therefore
that the Monarch should reject ministerial advice on prorogation under exceptional
circumstances such as these and thus uphold the primacy of Parliament in the
British constitution.
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